The destruction of ethics today is achieved by considering it as human creation, by reducing its study to the human sciences (psychology, sociology) and by the principle that all interest (be it individual, be it social) is egoism. Moral experience is incompatible with this approach. Morality is part of the ontological structure of free human action. The denial of morality involves the destruction of man.
Examination of the arguments that St Thomas Aquinas gives to support the non-existence of God, which are contained in the Summa Theologiae. The first argument relies on the existence of evil; the second rests on the self-sufficiency of the world and of freedom.
Texts are introduced, and the fact that this arguments are a historical novelty with no located records is shown.
The two atheistic Thomistic arguments are studied. Regarding the first one, the author shows the sense given by Duns Scotus and by the great commentators (Cayetano, Báñez and John of St Thomas). Regarding the second one, the nexus with the atheistic modern discussions and with the concept of autonomy is shown.
The work is concluded with the draft of a general theory of atheistic arguments and their main classification.
This article is limited to the discussion of some aspects of the «natural inclination to know the truth about God». In the first place it encompasses the general concept of natural inclination, in order to indicate that: 1) is compatible with satisfaction and frustration; 2) is conscious. This is why Freud’s doctrine of the unconscious is criticized. Secondly, it analyzes the sense of the knowledge of God whose natural inclination refers to. Finally, it is reminded that, according to St. Thomas, the natural knowledge of God is complemented with the knowledge of God through faith. Therefore, the article challenges Mr. Küng’s approach.
The Encyclical “Humanae vitae” establishes on a definitive way the position of the Roman Church with regard to two essential concepts: ‘conjugal love’ and “responsible parenthood”. The foundation of these concepts is the natural law. It is not an external imposed code, but it is in every man’s nature, and every man is able to know it to some extent, as evidenced by the spontaneous moral sense of everybody, for instance, in the immediate conscience of a determined case of injustice. It is not a feature added to human behavior, but its essential quality and therefore unavoidable.
Among those who completely separate thinking and being ( for example, nominalism) and those who identify them (immanentisms), metaphysical realism proposes to separate and unite both as it recognizes that there are several relationships between them. This paper explores these relationships, describing them in accordance to four determinations: thinking requires subjectively and objectively being; being requires qualitatively and quantitatively thinking. First of all, thinking requires being in the sense that it is a being. Further more, in the objective sense, thinking requires being because it is essentially thinking of the being. In the third place, being requires “qualitatively” thinking since the being is inherently intelligible (veritas transcendentalis). Ultimately being requires “quantitatively” thinking meaning that where there is greater perfection, there is more intellection; that perfect being is subsistent thinking; and that the finite being needs to be thought by God.
On October 12, 1974, Cardinal K. Wojtyla coincided with Prof. A. Millán-Puelles in a cycle of conferences organized in Rome. While exchanging a few words, the then archbishop of Kraków took from his briefcase the Italian translation (in Marietti) of Millán-Puelles’s structure of subjectivity, and told the Spanish philosopher that both followed similar philosophical paths.
Most written work (books) of Antonio Millán-Puelles is twenty titles. In this paper we determine what are some glitches were excluded and his unit is investigated. Titles grouped by subject, it seems clear that Millán-Puelles provides a foundation to enter their work in two capital books: Fundamentos de filosofía and Léxico filosófico. The rest of the books revolve around anthropology and ethics, and metaphysics. Regarding the former, the key work is La estructura de la subjetividad and ethics, La libre afirmación de nuestro ser. As for the latter Teoría del objeto puro. All other whirl around these. Thus it is clear that Milan-Puelles gets an original and unique synthesis between Aristotelian-Thomistic realist philosophy and the phenomenological and existentialist philosophies
The study of the Divine Essence has a central moment in the determination of the metaphysical constituive of God. This paper aims to offer some reflections of the proximity of the formulas Ipsum Esse Subsistens and Nóesis noéseos nóesis. That God is pure Understanding is not, for most of the Thomists, a mere operating attribute, but something particularly identified with Ens a se. To understand better this proximity, a shallow examination of the relationship between thinking and being in Thomism is proposed, so it will be exposed that the philosophy of St. Thomas is as “ontological” as “noetic”, ie, it adjusts with particular accurate the couple being and logos
This paper reflects on the concept of the person through the notions of love and relationship. It seeks dialogue with contemporary philosophies of personalistic court and with origins in the nineteenth-century idealism, to cope with some relevant mistakes. 1. Against the claim that a personal life is dumped in the love of others, a vital and ethically acceptable sense of self-love is defended. 2. The alternative substance-relationship is approached and the boethian concept of person as rational livelihood is reaffirmed towards the idea of the person as a relationship. 3. It is discussed the meaning of the statement that the person is “end in itself “, which some authors understands in the sense of an absolute autonomy of man.
Abordo en este trabajo una provincia del leibnizianismo que ha sido poco estudiada. Me refiero a la teoría de la voluntad. Sin duda, este defecto tiene cierto fundamento en el propio Leibniz, porque nuestro filósofo no dedicó al tema de la voluntad ningún trabajo monográfico, y porque acentuó más bien el concepto de libertad y absorbió en el tratamiento de ésta el de la voluntad, pues en algunos lugares de sus escritos declaró que tratar de la libertad incluye y equivale a tratar de la voluntad: «Inquirir si en nuestra voluntad hay libertad equivale a inquirir si en nuestra voluntad hay voluntad. Libre y voluntario significan lo mismo».